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I. Let me rehearse, to begin, the core of Boghossian's incompatibilist 
argument. From premises 
(1) If I have the concept of water, then water exists. 
(2) I have the concept of water, 
it follows that 
(3) Water exists. 
The paradox arises as we realize that (3) is clearly not knowable a 
priori, but (1) and (2) are. (2) holds 'a priori' because, according 
to Boghossian, it "just is the view that I have called the doctrine 
of privileged self-knowledge" (p. 202). The core of the paper is de-
voted, though, to argue that an extemalist {i.e., someone who holds 
the view that " ... fact s external to a thinker's skin are relevant to 
the individuation of (certain of) his mental contents" (p. 199). is 
bound to concede that (1) is knowable ' a prior£' . It would follow 
that, contrary to intuition, (3) can be known a priori since is the 
conclusion of an inference that relies on two premises that are, in 
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turn, knowable a priori. All this is envisaged by Boghossian as an 
argument for incompatibilism, that is, for the claim that External-
ism and Privileged Access are inconsistent because their combination 
leads to utterly absurd consequences. 
In the present comment, however, I will advocate for compatibil-
ism. My challenge to Boghossian's incompatibilist argument divides 
into two steps. At a first stage, I will focus on premise (2), and 
explore to what extent the privileged access that a subject has to 
her own mental contents may ensure the 'a priori' knowability of 
premise (2). To this purpose I will compare my access to the truth 
of the claim 'I have the concept of water' with my access to the truth 
of claims like 'I know how to ride a bike', 'I master the concept of 
checkmate'·, 'I think I have a checkmate in two moves', and 'I think 
there is some water in the fridge'. The upshot will be that, contrary 
to what premise (2) indicates, I cannot know 'a prion., that I mas-
ter a certain concept, since it seems clear that it could occur that 
I would wrongly believe that I master a certain concept. This does 
not amount to denying, as we shall see, a privileged or special access 
to one's own concepts, but not so privileged as to exclude the pos-
sibility that certain facts of the world may come to challenge one's 
beliefs in this respect. 
At second stage, I will shift to premise (1). I will then insist that 
the externalist only needs to grant this premise on the assumption 
that water is a natural kind concept, and not merely on the as-
sumption that 'water ' is aimed at expressing a natural kind concept. 
To reach this conclusion, I will certainly have to rebut Boghossian's 
remarks to the contrary. But, if I would succeed, then it would 
follow that the externalist, even if she should grant the 'a prion., 
knowability of premise (2), would not have to concede that the fact 
that water exists is also knowable ' a prion.,. For her knowledge of 
premise (1) would rest on an assumption (i.e., that water is a natural 
kind concept) whose truth can only be known 'a posteriori'. As a 
result, Boghossian's incompatibilist argument would be under some 
pressure. 
2. Let us consider premise (2). At the outset, the Privileged Access 
doctrine is presented like this: "I can know without empirical in-
vestigation (a) that I am entertaining a thought; (b) that it has a 
particular conceptual content, and (c) that its content is that water 
is wet" (p. 198). This is referred to as the traditional doctrine. And, 
strictly speaking, Boghossian is supposed to explore to what extent 
this doctrine is consistent with Externalism. I must confess that, 
faced with this rather general characterization of Privileged Access, 
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I feel uncertain as to how much this doctrine should comprise and, 
relatedly, how plausible it may finally be. In an attempt to elabo-
rate this perplexity, let me consider a few cases that may help us to 
determine in a slightly more precise way the content of a plausible 
Privileged Access doctrine, and see whether, on such a doctrine, I 
could know 'a priori' premise (2). 
2.1. Undoubtedly, I know that I know how to ride a bike. How does 
I get to know about this ability of mine? There is a trivial sense in 
which I needn't carry out any empirical investigation to have tbis 
valuable piece of knowledge. But, indeed, none would deny that 
my knowing that I possess that ability depends on my knowledge of 
certain facts of the world that involve my previous performances on 
a bike. 
Take the mental content 'I know how to ride a bike'. Adult people 
are rarely wrong in this respect, but, of course, one would not be sur-
prised if a child may mistakenly believe that she knows how to ride a 
bike or how to swim and, more typically, if a child would unwarrant-
edly have that kind of belief. Thus, I once heard of someone who, 
being otherwise more or less a normal person, decided that he had 
learned how to swim by studying how other people were performing 
and, after this conscientious study, dived into the swimming pooL 
Fortunately, there was someone around to rescue him. What strikes 
me about this case is not that this person had the false belief that he 
knew how to swim, but rather that he could have acquired that be-
lief by such manifestly inadequate means. Watching other people's 
performance is not a means (at least, ordinarily) to learn swimming. 
For a certain practice in that art seems indispensable. In general, we 
assume that, typically, a human being can only justifiedly belief that 
she knows how to swim if she has gone through a certain process of 
training. 
A consequence of this is that certain public facts about me must 
be true, for me to justifiedly believe that I know how to swim and, 
t hereby, for me to know that I know how to swim. It does not sound 
then reasonable to claim that I can know 'a priori' that I have this 
ability. It is true that, in a trivial sense, in order to have this kind 
of knowledge I needn't carry out any empirical investigation. But 
in this trivial sense I also know without empirical investigation that 
water exists. 
The second moral I want to draw from this example goes like 
this. It is not accidental that, in order to describe a situation where 
someone unjustifiedly believes that he knows how to swim, I have 
shifted to the attitudes of children or the case of a relatively weird 
person. In fact, we tend to assume that , among normal adult people, 
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this kind of thing does not happen but very rarely. But how is 
it? Does this reveal a special access to one's abilities on the sipe 
of normal adult people? Notice that I say 'special', not 'a· priori' 
or 'independent of one's knowledge of some particular facts of the 
world'. Yes, special, but not mysterious: it has to do with the way 
'normal adult people' and their beliefs about their own abilities are 
individuated. X is a normal adult human being only if beliefs about 
her abilities are typically acquired by means that justify her in having 
those beliefs. It follows from this metaphysical principle, that a 
human being that does not satisfy this condition is weird or childish 
or, at least, temporarily weird or childish. 
2.2. What is the relevance of these stories about swimming pools 
and bikes to the knowledge of one's mental contents? To answer 
this question, let us see how our remarks above apply to cases where 
beliefs about one's mental contents are involved. I am playing chess 
with my friend Michael. I know that I believe that I have a check-
mate in two moves unless Michael protects his king with a certain 
improbable move. I try hard to hide my excitement so that my 
friend should not suspect and engage in any extraexploration of the 
available moves. 
I have a special access to my belief, an access that is alien to 
my behavior and expressions at that particular moment. That is 
why the hiding maneuver is at all possible. Yet, my having such a 
belief presupposes a certain mastery of the rules of chess and, more 
specifically, of the concept of checkmate. 
It sounds clear, however, that someone may wrongly believe that 
she masters the concept of checkmate or that she masters the rules 
of chess. This is, of course, quite common during the process of 
training. Moreover, it is quite strange that someone would believe 
that he has a mastery of those rules and concepts without having 
engaged in certain practice with chess or related games. Once again, 
it seems that the means by which ordinary people acquire the belief 
that they master a certain concept are also means that justify their 
having such a belief. There is room, indeed, for an ordinary person 
exceptionally acquiring that belief in an inappropriate way, or for 
weird people to unjustifiedly believe that they master a certain con-
cept. This sort of disadjustment has a limit beyond which it would 
be unclear that the subject at stake is actually having a belief about 
her mastery of a certain concept. 
So, it seems that my justifiedly believing that I master the concept 
of checkmate is not independent of the correctness of some past (and, 
for similar reasons, future) performances of mine. Moreover, the idea 
of 'a priori' knowledge seems to comprise an internalist element: 
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knowing that p 'a priori' involves my being able to provide certain 
reasons to justify my believing that p -reasons that, indeed, should 
not mention any particular facts of the world. So, if I should know 
'a priori' that I master the concept of checkmate, I should be able 
to provide some sort of evidence that is independent of what occurs 
in the world. But it seems that" this cannot be done, that I should 
ultimately include within that evidence the reasons why I believe 
that I performed correctly in the past or, alternatively, supply some 
further examples of my current capacities. It sounds then that my 
knowledge of the concepts I master is not 'a prion.,, even if it is 
special. And the source of this specialness, like in the riding of 
a bike, derives from some metaphysical principles of individuation. 
These principles ensure that when únoêmal=adult person claims 'I 
master the concept of checkmate', she typically needn't provide any 
justification. The problem for Boghossian's argument arises as we 
realize that, in those situations where that person would need to 
justify the truth of her belief, the kind of evidence that may supply 
could hardly be gathered 'a prion.,. 
2.3. All this ha3 quite direct implications for the epistemic status of 
premise (2), namely: 'I have the concept of water'. It is quite clear, 
and follows from my previous remarks, that someone (typically, a 
child) may mistakenly believe that she has the required mastery of 
the concept of water and, also, that any attempt that this person 
may undertake to justify her belief that she has the mastery at stake 
will require that this person should mention her knowledge of certain 
facts of the world. So, once again, the knowledge that an adult 
person may have of premise (2) is special -since she needn't provide 
any justification of it but in exceptional circumstances: there are 
some metaphysical individuation principles that ensure that adult 
persons can't be but exceptionally wrong in this respect- but not 
a priori.1 
2.4. To sum up this first step of my discussion, I could say that I 
have tried to make room for the specialness of a subject's access to 
her own concepts without being committed to the implausible claim 
that they are known 'a priori', that is, independently of our knowl-
1In these remarks, I have focused on a subject's beliefs about the mastery of a 
certain concept, since that is the nature of the belief stated in premise (2). Yet, 
it is clear that the traditional doctrine about Privileged Access tends to target 
a different kind of belief, namely: beliefs about a certain mental content like 'I 
think I have a checkmate in two moves'. The special access that a subject may 
have to her own mental contents differs in some important respects from the 
special access to the concepts that she may master. This is, however, a point on 
which I cannot dwell now. 
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edge of particular facts of the world. The intuition is that, in those 
scenarios were the subject is recognized as having privileged access to 
her concepts, the conditions under which a subject acquires a belief 
about her concepts typically coincide with those that justify that be-
lief. All this casts doubt on Boghossian's argument insofar as those 
conditions involve particular facts of the world whose instantiation 
cannot be known ' a priori'.2 
3. Let us now shift to premise (1). At first sight, it sounds that an 
externalist would only concede its truth on the assumption that 
(A) water is a natural kind concept. 
-
Moreover, an externalist will have reason to deny that (A) could 
be known 'a priori', since the truth of (A) would depend, on her 
account, on some environmental facts. 3 This contention does not 
2 My approach surely exploits some aspects of the treatment of self-knowledge 
that Donald Davidson and Tyler Burge have suggested in some of their writings 
(cf. Davidson (1987) and Burge (1989)). They tend to insist that self-knowledge 
is not a mystery because the conditions for the individuation of mental content 
coincide with the conditions for believing that one has such contents. So, there 
is little (or no) room for a gap between having a certain thought and believing 
that one has that thought, and this vigorous metaphysical connection seems to 
ensure the transition from believing that one has a certain thought to knowing 
that one has it. Relatedly, I have been pointing out that the conditions for the 
individuation of the mastery of concepts (and mental contents) typically coincide 
with the conditions for justifiedly believing that one masters that concept (or 
possesses a certain mental content). · 
Yet, I have tried to belabor this intuition by highlighting, firstly, that such 
a coincidence has partly to do with the fact that normal adult human beings 
are individuated in such a way that the means by which they may acquire the 
mastery of a concept are also the means by which they acquire the belief that 
she masters that concept. Secondly, I have insisted that it is compatible with this 
metaphysical principle that, occasionally, a subject should unjustifiedly believe 
that she masters a certain concept C and, consequently, that one must leave 
some room for disadjustment between believing that one masters a concept and 
mastering it. My main point has, in any case, been that the combination of all 
these elements allows us to explain why a subject's knowledge about the concepts 
that she masters may be special, but not 'a prion"', since the kind of reason she 
may ment ion to justify her belief would necessarily comprise her knowledge of 
some particular facts of the world. 
3This is a point that Jessica Brown (cf. Brown (1995, p. 154)) seems to con-
cede. She seeks, however, to neutralize the impact of assumption (A) by stressing 
that there is still some kind of 'a priori' knowledge of the world that the external-
ist is bound to recognize. Thus, Burge would have to accept that, "for example1 
from the fact t hat he [Oscar] knows a priori that he has a thought involving the 
concept of water, he could come to know a priori that (either his environment 
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necessarily conflict with the Privileged Access doctrine or even with 
the 'a priori' knowability of premise (2). For one could reasonably 
claim that my knowing that I have the concept of water does not 
entail that I know that water is a natural kind concept. This is, in 
fact, a point that Boghossian seems to grant and, therefore, I will 
save you the rationale. 4 In any event, if all this turned out to be 
true, then premise (1) could not be known 'a priori' since it relies on 
contains water and the concept of water is a natural kind concept, or he is part 
of a comm.Ull..ity which has the concept of water)" (Brown (1995, p. 155)). In 
my view, this line of reply significantly debilitates the initial argument, whose 
strength derives from the neat conviction that one cannot know a priori that 
water e..xists or any other particular fact of the world. For, on Brown's disjunc-
tive proposal, it sounds now quite natural to grant that, if a subject can know 'a 
priori' that she has a certain concept, she can also know 'a prion., that the world 
must be such as to enable her to possess that concept. -Furthermore, assuming 
-as Boghossian's argument does- that the externalist doctrine is knowable 'a 
prion., seems almost equivalent to assuming the 'a priod knowability of the fact 
that the disjunctive condition is part of those enabling circumstances.(Cf. Miller 
(1997) for a discussion of this point, and Burge (1993) for the notion of ' a pri-
on.., that may be involved). Hence, if one would be inclined to disapprove of 
the 'a prion., knowability of the latter, one would have to dismiss the 'a priori' 
knowability of externalism and, as a result, the incompatibilist argument woúd=
be damned. 
In any event, Brown's line of defense is not only quite inadequate, but unavail-
able to Boghossian because Brown's strategy presupposes that water would be 
atomic or compound depending on some external circumstances and, as we shall 
soon see, this is something that Boghossian cannot accept. 
4In any event, it is not hard to motivate the claim that someone may know 
that she has the concept of water without knowing that water is a natural kind 
concept; specially, if one assumes the 'a prion1 knowability of premise (2). 
It seems clear that different individuals may have the same concept C despite 
variations in their respective degree of mastery of it. l'his seems a precondition 
for several individuals to have the same thought, the same desire or belief, since 
identity of thoughts presupposes identity of concepts. Yet, a consequence of this 
fact is that the possession of concept C is consistent with a limited access on the 
side of the subject to the elements involved in that concept. This limited access 
seems to be a sequel of the identity of concepts across individuals. 
If this were true, then I could claim that someone may possess the concept of 
water without having a complete mastery of that concept. And, more interest-
ingly, that someone may know that she possesses the concept of water without 
knowing every element involved in the concept of water. Still, we should need 
to motivate a more particular claim, namely: that someone may know that she 
possesses the concept of water without knowing a particularly central feature of 
it, that is, that it is a natural kind concept. Let us see how this could be done. 
Consider now two well-known cases of concepts that aimed at designating a 
natural kind: phlogiston and caloric. It sounds plausible to describe the situation 
as follows: at a certain stage in the history of science, scientist justifiedly believed 
that phlogiston and caloric were two natural kind concepts, but in time they 
discovered that they were wrong, that there is no natural kind that they may 
.I 
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an assumption to which we have only an 'a posteriori' access and, 
consequently, Boghossian's incompatibilist argument would fail. 
4. But, indeed, Boghossian is quite reluctant .to grant that an ex-
ternalist could only be forced to accept premise (1) on assumption 
(A). For, as he points out, a Twin- Earth argument can be run even 
if 'water' does not actually express a natural kind concept, but only 
aims at being so: 
The reason this particular objection doesn't succeed is that it is quite 
clear that we can run aTE experiment on a word that doesn't actually 
name a natural kind. Suppose we had such a word, W, on Earth. Then, 
to get a successful TE experiment, all you need to do is describe a Twin 
situation in which, although the users of the word type W are functional 
and molecular duplicates of their counterparts on Earth, W does name 
a kind in the Twin situation. Provided intuition still has it that the 
extension of Earthly tokens of W are different from the extension of the 
Twin tokens of W -which of course they will be since the extension of 
the former will be empty and the extension of the latter won't be- the 
experiment will succeed. (P. 205). 
designate. Nothing like that has occurred with the concept of water precisely 
because there is empirical evidence that there is a single substance that plays a 
certain causal role R. This is a contingent fact. 
It seems to me that a similar intuition lies behind David Lewis' and J aegwon 
Kim's (Of. Lewis (1970, 1994) and Kim (1992))remarks about how multiple re-
alization may pose a problem as to the causal efficacy of functional properties. 
The fact that 'human pain' designates a property depends on the rather contin-
gent fact that the functional role that is proper to pain has the same realization 
in every member of the human species. It is perfectly intelligible that we could 
discover, for instance, that 'human pain' is multirealized and, in that case, one 
would have to claim that such phrase does not pick up a property but only a 
functional role. I guess that what goes for 'human pain', holds for 'water' as 
well: it is intelligible that we could have discovered that úwaíÉêD=does not des-
ignate a property, but simply picks up a functional role. This is not something 
that we know 'a éêáonúK=
To see the relevance of this discussion to our present point, I could firstly say 
that it follows from the previous remarks that people that master the concepts 
of human pain, water, caloric, or phlogiston may discover, after empirical inves-
tigation, that some of such concepts do (or don't) have a referent, do (or don't) 
designate a property. So, if one is supposed to have 'a éêáonú=access to one's 
concepts, then the fact that a term has a referent, that it designates a property, 
it is not something that one knows by the mere fact of knowing that one possesses 
the concept that such a term expresses. It seems then that, at least those who 
acknowledge the 'a éêáonú=knowability of premise (2), must recognize that some-
one may know that she has the concept of water without knowing that water is 
a natural kind concept. 
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I suspect, however, that this sort of consideration may be both wrong 
and irrelevant. 
a) Let me indicate firstly why I think it may be irrelevant. Suppose 
I concede that a Twin-Earth experiment can be run on a word W 
which on Earth does not express a natural kind concept, my question 
is: why should this affect my claim that an externalist only needs to 
concede premise {1) on assumption {A)? It is true that, ifBoghossian 
is right, a term may be TE-eligible even if, on Earth, the correspond-
ing (A)-premise does not hold with respect to it. But my previous 
line of reasoning is not merely saying that "in addition to aiming to 
express a natural kind, a word must actually name a natural kind, if 
it is to be Twin Earth-eligible" (p. 205), which is the explicit target 
of Boghossian's reply. What I am insisting is that an externalist only 
needs to concede (1) if (A) is true and, in this respect, it seems clear 
that the fact that a term is TE-eligible does not guarantee that an 
externalist should concede that the corresponding (1)-premise is true 
with regard to the concept that word W expresses on Earth, since, 
as Boghossian himself insists, a word W may be TE-eligible even if 
the corresponding (1)-premise is false on Earth. It sounds then that 
in order to admit (1), the externalist needs more than TE-eligibility, 
she needs (A). 
b) Let us now see why I suspect that Boghossian's considerations 
in the quote above are wrong or, in other words, the reasons why 
I doubt that a Twin-Earth experiment could be run on a word W 
which does not express a natural kind concept on Earth. The reason 
is this. Putnam's Twin- Earth argument relies on the assumption 
that natural kind terms contain a tacit indexical element, that their 
extension and referent is irreducibly fixed by means of an ostensive 
definition like, for instance: "'water' is stuff that bears a certain 
similarity relation to the water around here" .5 Or, in other words, 
'water' designates a liquid like this. Boghossian takes it that for a 
given word W, even if it is not a natural kind term on Earth, it 
could be so on Twin-Earth. My question is, though: how could the 
extension and reference of Won Twin- Earth be determined? What 
sort of ostensive definition could one employ to that purpose? Let 
us consider a pair of possibilities: 
5Putnam (1975, p. 234). By saying this, I am not committing myself to the 
claim that 'water' is a.n indexica.l term, that is, tha.t 'water' behaves like indexicals 
in every crucial respect. To put it in Burge's terms, wha.t I am claiming is 
that having beliefs about water "requires that one be in not-purely-context-free 
conceptual relations to the relevant entities. That is, one must be in the sort of 
relation to the entities that someone who indexica.lly refers to them would be". 
(Burge (1982), p. 106). 
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i) One might treat Twin- Earth as if it were another planet with 
real people, trees, and rivers on it. In such a case, we can make sense 
of someone providing an ostensive definition of word W on Twin-
Earth. But, no wonder, this won't serve to· the purposes of Boghos-
sian's incompatibilist argument. For, in that case, it- would be an 
empirical question whether W is a natural kind term on Twin-Earth 
and, hence, TE-eligibility would still depend on some empirical facts. 
ii) Suppose, on the contrary and most reasonably, that Twin-
Earth refers to a counterfactual situation. How do we produce os-
tensive definitions in counterfactual situations? How do we point 
to a certain region in the counterfactual spa{;e? It sounds that the 
individuation of those situations is essentially parasitic upon some 
actual indexicalizations: it would be like this pointing but differing 
in that and that respect. Now, Boghossian's scenario is such that we 
could not actually point to any natural kind in defining the word W, 
since there is no such natural kind. So, how could we define a nat-
ural kind term in the Twin-Earth counterfactual situation? At first 
sight, it may sound that we have quite a simple procedure, namely: 
(P) 'W' designates the natural kind that on Twin- Earth accom-
plishes such and such functional role. 
Yet, this procedure clearly falls short of what a natural kind term 
requires. It is essential to a natural kind term that one could dis-
cover that some aspects of the functional role initially employed to 
individuate that natural kind do not belong to it, are not properties 
of such natural kind. But this kind of discovery is trivially excluded 
by procedure P. This epistemic circumstance is not alien to the se-
mantics of natural kind terms, since one of its crucial functions is to 
allow speakers to refer to the same stuff despite variations in their 
knowledge of its functional role. Hence, a term whose extension is 
fixed by that procedure P is not a natural kind term. But, how 
else could the reference and extension of word W in the Twin-Earth 
counterfactual situation be fixed so that it could operate as a natural 
kind term? Tills is, perhaps, the form that my second question to 
Boghossian may adopt. In any event, it is obvious that Putnam's 
Twin- Earth experiment is not at all prey to this kind of objection: 
Twater is the stuff that has on Earth the same functional role as wa:.. 
ter on Earth, and this holds stable across variations in our knowledge 
of that functional role. 
5. I conjecture, to close, that Boghossian would be dissatisfied with 
my line of reasoning on point (a). For, he would argue, I am as-
suming that word W would not only express a different concept on 
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Earth and Twin-Earth, but also a concept of a different nature: one 
would be a natural kind concept, but not the other. And, faced with 
this situation, the extemalist would have to acknowledge that W on 
Earth would be a compound concept and on Twin-Earth an atomic 
one. And Boghossian is quite reluctant, in virtue of some metaphys-
ical reasons, to accept that the atomicity or compositionality of a 
concept should depend on external circumstances such as those that 
the externalist mentions: 
A concept's compositionality is exclusively function of its internal 'syn-
tax' and can't be contingent upon external circumstances in the way the 
present proposal would require. (P. 208). 
In the face of this, I would like firstly ask for some remarks as to 
the kind of metaphysical reasons that Boghossian may have in mind, 
since his contribution is quite hermetic in this respect. 
Secondly, I would also welcome any comments as to how I should 
interpret the distinction between atomic vs. compound concepts. In 
the light of the rather scarce remarks that figure in the paper, I am 
inclined to say that, according to Boghossian: 
A concept is compound if it is solely individuated in terms of 
a functional role 
while, given that the distinction is assumed to be exhaustive: 
A concept is atomic if and only it is not solely individuated in 
terms of a functional role. 
It follows that, by definition, natural kind terms are atomic, and 
general terms that fail to be natural kind are equally by definition 
compound. It seems, then, that according to the externalist, the syn-
tax of a concept should depend on certain external circumstances. 
But, according to Boghossian, this cannot be. Yet, insisting on this 
point, without providing any further motivation, sounds like begging 
the question against the externalist. For the externalist, in claiming 
"that facts external to the thinker's skin are relevant to the indi-
viduation of (certain of) his mental states" (p. 199), seems to be 
assuming that the individuation of the nature (as natural kind con-
cepts and, by definition, as atomic) of some of the concepts involved 
in such mental states also depends on facts external to the thinker's 
skin. 
6. With this I close my exposition of the reasons why I think that an 
extemalist needn't concede that she can know (1) 'a priori'. More-
over, in my revision of premise (2), I concluded that a reasonable 
.-
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account of privileged access does not supply 'a priori' knowledge 
about whether one masters a certain concept. So, if I am right, 
there is no reason why the combination of externalism and the privi-
leged access doctrine should lead to 'a priori' knowability of the fact 
that water exists.6 
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